7 Addressing the United Nations General Assembly in December 1988, gorbachev went further, delivering the most important foreign policy speech of his career. He renounced class warfare as the basis of soviet foreign policy, embraced "pan-humanist values" and "global interdependence and pledged to convert an "economy of armaments into an economy of disarmament." he invited the us to cooperate in ending the cold War by halting the arms. Then he made dramatic unilateral concessions, pledging to reduce soviet ground forces by 500,000 and to withdraw 50,000 troops from Eastern Europe, as well as 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat aircraft, over a two-year period. 8 The speech had a stunning impact in Western Europe-and not just there. The new York times, not normally given to hyperbole, wrote: Perhaps not since woodrow Wilson presented his fourteen points in 1918 or since Franklin roosevelt and Winston Churchill promulgated the Atlantic Charter in 1941 has a world figure demonstrated the vision mikhail Gorbachev displayed yesterday. 9 The question of Gorbachev's intentions animated policy discussions in the White house and in the us intelligence community.
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Although some readers may unforgettable be familiar with the Estimates that describe political and economic issues surrounding the collapse of communism and the end of the cold War, they should find the Estimates on military-strategic issues unique. Estimates and intelligence memoranda on soviet and Warsaw Pact military forces-especially the nie 11-3/8 series on soviet Forces and Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict, the bible on soviet strategic nuclear weapons for us military planners, weapons program managers, and arms control specialists-reveal facts and interpretations. While these Estimates helped the United States maintain its defenses, they also made it possible for us policymakers to engage the soviet Union in conventional and strategic arms talks that led to the end of the arms race even before the cold War itself had. top of page the road to malta President george bush entered office in January 1989 determined to put his own stamp on America's foreign policy and make us-soviet relations its main focus. 4 he intended to build on the legacy of his predecessor without reprising Ronald reagan's policy. On 15 February 1989 the President ordered a review of us policy toward the ussr and Eastern Europe, which, for a variety of political and bureaucratic reasons, took longer and proved more complicated than expected. 5 In behind-the-scenes discussions, the new foreign policy team quickly divided into those who wanted to open an immediate dialogue with Gorbachev and those who took a skeptical view of the new-style soviet leader. 6 The first soviet challenge to the new Bush administration arrived even before the President's inauguration. To reverse the foreign policy course inherited from his predecessors and to relieve tensions that had accumulated in us-soviet relations in the 1970s and 1980s, in 1987 Gorbachev signed the us-soviet Treaty on Elimination of Intermediate-range and Shorter-Range missiles (inf the first nuclear arms reduction. Then in 1988, he announced his intention to withdraw soviet forces from Afghanistan within a year.
For a brief span of time, the extraordinary became an almost daily event. Estimates that seemed premature or pessimistic or alarmist often turned out to be too conservative in their forecasts within six months or a year. Some key events, such as soviet acquiescence in German unification within nato, happened so quickly and business unexpectedly that they do not even appear in any of the Estimates. The Estimates, in fact, often accurately anticipated an event or development but misjudged the time it would take for it to materialize-an indication of the acceleration of history in this period. Readers of the Estimates that follow may find the terms of discussion familiar, since they generally paralleled contemporary discussions in the press and academe. They may be surprised, however, to discover that the Intelligence community early on took a pessimistic view of Gorbachev's chances for success in reforming the soviet system when that was not a popular view inside or outside the government. The Estimates also predicted the impending implosion of the soviet system and anticipated some of the problems for internal, regional, and international stability that the collapse of soviet power would create. Fortunately, the direst predictions of widespread famine and civil war proved wrong.
The centrifugal forces in the "outer empire" stimulated and accelerated those in the "inner empire" as the soviet republics sought sovereignty and then independence from Moscow. At the same time, gorbachev's domestic reforms ran into serious trouble, and the economy went into a tailspin. Gorbachev's struggle with the old imperial elite in the communist party, the armed forces, and the military-industrial complex culminated in the august 1991 coup, which, when it failed, finished off the ussr-and Gorbachev himself. On Christmas day 1991, at 7:35. M., the soviet flag flying over the Kremlin was lowered and replaced by the new Russian banner. The ussr officially ceased to exist on 31 December. The cold War was over. The national Intelligence Estimates and other intelligence assessments reprinted below reveal publicly for the first time how the us intelligence community interpreted and predicted the rapidly unfolding events that led to the collapse of communism and the end of the cold War. The bush administration's stewardship of American foreign policy coincided with some of the most momentous changes of the 20th century.
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Tenet for his support and cooperation. We also would like to thank cia's Executive director, david. Carey, for his assistance in releasing the documents. Closer to home, we want to thank cia's Office of Information Management, headed by Edmund Cohen, and in particular James Oliver, chief of the historical review Program, howard Stoertz, john Vogel, and James Noren. We also would like to thank readers who took the time to examine this volume in draft and to make comments, and Michael Warner, deputy Chief of the history Staff, who worked closely with us on this project. Haines Chief Historian September 1999 top of page preface The last great drama of the cold War-the collapse of communism in the soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the end of the four-decade-old East-West conflict-unfolded in three acts between 19Even as the story began, soviet.
To convince the west, and above all the new administration in Washington, of his sincerity, gorbachev had made major concessions on arms control, withdrawn soviet troops from Afghanistan, pledged to reduce soviet ground forces by half a million, and rejected class warfare in favor. Initially skeptical because of past disappointments with détente, president george bush and his foreign policy team gradually convinced themselves visit that Gorbachev was ready for dialogue and compromise. They set a high price for cooperation, however, and were gratefully surprised to find that the soviets were willing to pay. The second act of the drama began in the fall of 1989 with peaceful revolutions in Eastern and Central Europe (except Romania) and the fall of the soviet "outer empire." The de facto collapse of the warsaw Pact (it would formally dissolve itself a year. East Germany, the ussr's main prize from World War ii, was united with West Germany and integrated into nato. The third and final act closed with the 1991 dissolution of the ussr.
Cia continues to review and declassify finished intelligence on these countries. These records are available at nara's Archives ii facility in College park, maryland, in Records Group 263 (Central Intelligence Agency records). 2 Two of the documents reprinted in this volume originated with cia's Office of soviet Analysis (sova). Both have been cited in accounts of us-soviet relations during the bush administration and have been discussed elsewhere. 3 The complete texts appear here for the first time.
Fischer tried to identify and release the most important analysis available for this period. His selection is comprehensive. Some of the documents, especially those on military-strategic subjects, were only partially declassified, since they contain data from still-sensitive sources and methods. Readers should understand, however, that even the portions reprinted here contain information that until recently was highly classified. We want to note, in addition, that we have selected only estimates and assessments prepared during the bush administration. We realize that, in some cases, estimates and other forms of finished intelligence issued before 1989 may have addressed some of the same issues and even reached some of the same conclusions as those that came later, but our focus is exclusively on what was. Fischer and I would like to thank all those responsible for making this compendium and the conference possible. Above all, we would like to thank former President george bush and his staff for enthusiastically endorsing the conference and Director of Central Intelligence george.
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Bush Center for Presidential Studies at Texas a m university co-sponsored a conference on "us intelligence and the End of the cold War" on the texas a m university campus at College Station from 18 to 20 november 1999. As a contribution to the conference, csi prepared a compendium of newly declassified us intelligence documents covering the years. This period encompassed events in the ussr and Eastern Europe that transformed the postwar world and much of the 20th century's geopolitical landscape. It was a time when the tempo of history accelerated so rapidly that, as one historian put it, events seemed to be moving beyond human control, if not human comprehension. Fischer of cia's History Staff selected, edited, and wrote the preface to the national Intelligence Estimates and other intelligence assessments included in this companion volume. 1 In conjunction with the conference, the Intelligence community will release shredder to the national Archives and Records Administration (nara) the records reprinted in this compendium and those listed in the Appendix. The declassification and release of these documents marks a new stage in the cia's commitment to openness. The Agency has only rarely declassified and made available to the public and to scholars Cold War records of such recent vintage. The new release complements and supplements the previous declassification of more than 550 National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and Special National Intelligence Estimates (snies) on the soviet Union and Eastern Europe from 1946 to 1985.
Nic m 89-10003, October 1989, Status of soviet Unilateral Withdrawals pdf only 528KB*. Nic m 89-10005, november 1989, soviet Theater Forces in 1991: The Impact of the Unilateral Withdrawals on Structure and Capabilities (key judgments only) pdf only 98KB*. Nic m 90-10002, April 1990, The direction of Change write in the warsaw Pact pdf only 767KB* The military balance ii: Strategic Nuclear weapons. Nie 11-3/8-88, december 1988, soviet Forces and Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the late 1990s (key judgments and Executive summary) pdf only 863KB*. Nie 11-3/8-91, august 1991, soviet Forces and Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the year 2000 (key judgments only) pdf only 369KB*. Nie 11-30-91c, december 1991, The winter of the soviet Military: Cohesion or Collapse? Pdf only 380KB* Foreword The center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) of the central Intelligence Agency and the george.
: The war in Perspective (key judgments only pdf only 138KB*. Ni iim 91-10006, november 1991, soviet Tactical Nuclear Forces and Gorbachev's Nuclear Pledges: Impact, motivations, and Next Steps (key judgments only pdf only 130KB. The military balance I: Conventional Forces in Europe. Nie 11-14-89, february 1989, Trends and development in Warsaw Pact Theater Forces and Doctrine Through the 1990s. M/h nie 4-1-84, september 1989, warning of War in Europe: Changing Warsaw Pact Planning and Forces (key judgments only) pdf only 245KB*. Nic m 89-10002, september 1989, The post-cfe environment in Europe pdf only 236KB*.
Pdf only.22MB*. Central Intelligence Agency, office of soviet Analysis, April 1991, "The soviet cauldron". Pdf only 386KB*. Nie 11-18-91, july 1991, Implications real of Alternative soviet Futures, pDF 919KB*. Nie 11-18.3-91, november 1991, civil Disorder in the former ussr: Can It be managed This Winter? Pdf only 416kb the End of Empire I: Eastern Europe. The End of Empire ii: National Secession and Ethnic Conflict in the ussr 180 "New Thinking soviet Foreign Relations. Snie 11/37-88, march 1988, ussr: Withdrawal From Afghanistan (key judgments only pdf only 164KB*.
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Table of Contents, documents: a compendium of National Intelligence Estimates and Assessments (All Documents are in summary pdf* format). The soviet Crisis: Gorbachev and the perils. Nie 11-23-88, december 1988, gorbachev's Economic Programs: The Challenges Ahead. Pdf only.17MB*. Sov 89-10077, central Intelligence Agency, office of soviet Analysis, september 1989, gorbachev's Domestic Gambles and Instability in the ussr. Pdf only.19MB*. Nie 11-18-89, november 1989, The soviet System in Crisis: Prospects for the next Two years. Pdf only.7MB*. Nie 11-18-90, november 1990, The deepening Crisis in the ussr: Prospects for the next year.